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Belief reasoning is typical mental state reasoning in theory of mind (ToM). Although
previous studies have explored the neural bases of belief reasoning, the neural correlates
of belief reasoning for self and for others are rarely addressed. The decoupling
mechanism of distinguishing the mental state of others from one’s own is essential for
ToM processing. To address the electrophysiological bases underlying the decoupling
mechanism, the present event-related potential study compared the time course of
neural activities associated with belief reasoning for self and for others when the belief
belonging to self was consistent or inconsistent with others. Results showed that
during a 450–600 ms period, belief reasoning for self elicited a larger late positive
component (LPC) than for others when beliefs were inconsistent with each other. The
LPC divergence is assumed to reflect the categorization of agencies in ToM processes.
Keywords: belief reasoning, theory of mind, self, others, decoupling, late positive component
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, people need to think about the mental states of both themseleves and others,
and then understand and predict behaviors based on that knowledge. This ablility, playing a core
role in social interaction, is called the theory of mind (ToM) in psychological research. Since
Premack and Woodruff (1978) proposed the notion of ToM, many studies have been conducted to
understand the developmental processes in ToM, and how these processes are affected by particular
psychological or environmental factors (Wellman, 1992). However, we know very little about the
cognitive mechanisms of how the processing of ToM takes place in the brain as yet. In recent
years, the extensive use of event-related potential (ERP) methodology provides opportunities for
researchers to study this question from a cognitive neuroscience perspective, profiting from its high
temporal resolution.
Many studies suggest that ToM includes an understanding of different types of mental states,
such as: desire, belief, intention, and emotion (Wellman, 2011). To date, belief has attracted the
most abundant interest in research as a typical mental state. The acquisition of belief reasoning is
considered to be a milestone in ToM development. The electrophysiological mechanisms involved
in belief reasoning have been explored by using the ERP methodology. In the matter of paradigm,
prior work can be approximately divided into three categories.
The first type of research focuses on comparing the neural activity elicited by belief to that by
non-mental representations. For instance, Sabbagh and Taylor (2000) asked participants to reason
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about belief representations and photograph representations.
They found that these two kinds of reasoning decoupled on a slow
late component over left frontal areas. Liu et al. (2004, 2009b)
compared ERPs elicited by judgments based on belief to those
based on reality for adults and children. Results also confirmed
that belief reasoning was associated with a late slow wave (LSW)
with a left frontal scalp distribution.
The second kind of research mainly concerns the ERP
differences between belief reasoning and other types of mental
state, such as desire reasoning, pretense, and so on. Liu et al.
(2009a) investigated the neural correlates of belief reasoning
and desire reasoning in adults and children (Bowman et al.,
2012). Results revealed that both belief and desire reasoning
were associated with an anterior LSW. Studies explored the
neural basis of belief reasoning and pretense indicated that
false belief reasoning evoked an anterior LSW (600–900 ms)
for adults and a fronto-cental LSW (290–920 ms) for children,
which are assumed to reflect the decoupling mechanism of
metarepresentation (Meinhardt et al., 2012; Kühn-Popp et al.,
2013).
The third type of research focuses on ERPs that distinguish
between different kinds of belief reasoning. For example,
Meinhardt et al. (2011) found that there were two ERP
components differentiating false from true belief reasoning,
including a late positive component (LPC, 300–600 ms) and a
late anterior slow wave (LSW, 600–900 ms). Geangu et al. (2013)
recorded ERPs of participants who passively viewed photographic
sequences of a character performing actions under either false
or true belief conditions. The results are similar to those from
studies asking participants to conduct belief reasoning directly
(e.g., Meinhardt et al., 2011). A frontal LSW within the 570–
690 ms epoch was associated with the processing of false belief.
Another ERP study compared the brain activities elicited by the
standard false belief reasoning task to that by the adapted false
belief reasoning task. In the standard task, participants could see
that an object was transferred from location A to location B, while
in the adapted task, an object was transferred from location A
to a place that participants did not know. It was proposed that
the adapted task had lower inhibiting demands since participants
had no need to inhibit their knowledge about the real location
of the object. The standard task elicited a more positive LPC at
470–520 ms than that in the adapted task (Zhang et al., 2009).
Taken together, there is a general agreement that ERP
components associated with belief reasoning, such as LPC
and LSW, are normally later than 300 ms after the onset of
stimulus. However, the meaning of these components in belief
reasoning is controversial due to the variety of paradigms used
in existing studies. For example, previous studies suggest that
LPC is associated with the process of inhibition involved in
belief reasoning (Zhang et al., 2009), or the reorientation from
external stimuli to internal mental representations (Meinhardt
et al., 2011). For LSW, it has been proposed that it reflects
the processes associated with distinguishing mental states
from reality (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004),
or the decoupling mechanism involved in metarepresentation
(Meinhardt et al., 2012; Kühn-Popp et al., 2013). Consequently,
it is necessary to examine the neural activities in different forms
of belief reasoning tasks, which might provide more information
about the cognitive mechanisms involved in ToM processes.
Although the definition of ToM contains the understanding
of mental states for both self and others, previous studies mainly
focus on mental reasoning for others, usually a protagonist in
scenarios presents with text or photographs. Actually, in the
ToM tasks asking participant to reason about the mental state
of other people, the mental state of participant’s own must also
be taken into account. The decoupling mechanism of processing
the mental state of others independently from our own mental
state constitutes a core component of ToM (Gallagher and Frith,
2003).
Neuroimaging studies concerning mental reasoning for
different agencies (self or others) have been somewhat limited.
Vogeley et al. (2001) investigated the neural mechanisms of
taking self-perspective and modeling the mind of someone else
in a ToM paradigm. Results showed that both taking self-
perspective and modeling the mind of someone else led to
increased neural activity in the right prefrontal cortex. Saxe et al.
(2006) compared the neural activities of belief reasoning for
others and trait adjective judgment for self. They found that
both tasks activated the medial prefrontal and medial precuneus
significantly. A recent meta-analysis revealed that both self-
and other judgments are associated with activity in the medial
prefrontal cortex (MPFC). Specifically, self-related judgments
are more frequently activated the ventral MPFC, whilst other-
related judgments more frequently activate the dorsal MPFC
(Denny et al., 2012). In addition, there is some evidence that
sub-regions of the MPFC distinguish between thinking about
similar and dissimilar others. The dorsal MPFC is recruited for
reasoning about dissimilar others, whilst the ventral MPFC is
used in reasoning about self or similar others (Mitchell et al.,
2005, 2006; Pfeifer et al., 2007). These findings suggest that belief
reasoning for different agencies may at least partly implement
distinct neural bases.
Moreover, there are two recent studies specifically investigated
the neural underpinnings of the decoupling mechanism
distinguishing mental states belonging to different agencies
in ToM reasoning. In an fMRI study conducted by Schuwerk
et al. (2014a), the results suggest that the posterior medial
prefrontal cortex (pMPFC) helps to process others’ inconsistent
beliefs decoupled from one’s own perspective. Furthermore,
Schuwerk et al. (2014b) modulated pMPFC activity by repetitive
transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) and observed that
the inhibition of this region impaired the ability to distinguish
the other’s belief from one’s own. These findings support
the important role of pMPFC in the decoupling mechanism,
however, the time course of the process to separate and compare
the mental states of different agencies (self or others) remains
unclear.
The present study aimed to investigate those ERP components
associated with the decoupling mechanism in ToM reasoning
by comparing the neural correlates underlying belief reasoning
for self and for others. Furthermore, the consistency of beliefs
between one’s own and that of others was also considered. In
consistent conditions, participants had the same beliefs with a
protagonist in ToM scenarios, whilst in inconsistent conditions
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they held conflicting beliefs to the protagonist. Given the core role
of ToM in interpersonal interaction, the present study allows us
to gain an insight into the cognitive neural mechanism of how
the ToM processed in social interaction between self and others.
It also helps us to understand better some social developmental




Seventeen participants voluntarily took part in the present task.
All of them were right handed and with normal or corrected to
normal vision. A participant was excluded because of a failure
of the electricity supply during the experimental procedure. The
remaining sixteen participants (seven males) were aged between
19 and 24 years (M= 21.28 years, SD= 1.5 years). All participants
received monetary compensation for their participation and
signed an informed consent for the experiment before the
testing. The experiment was approved by the Academic Ethics
Committee of Guangxi University.
Procedure
The present belief reasoning task is based on the diverse-
beliefs task, which is a classic ToM test and is used in several
developmental and ERP studies (Wellman and Woolley, 1990;
Wellman and Liu, 2004; Wellman et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2009a;
Bowman et al., 2012). For example, in a typical diverse-beliefs
task, participants were told that there were two different positions
in which a cat might be hidden (e.g., the bushes and the garage)
and they were asked where they thought the cat was. After
participants answered (e.g., the bushes), they were told that a
character, Linda, thought that the cat was in the other position
(e.g., the garage). Then, participants were asked to predict where
Linda would look for the cat (the bushes or the garage). The
present belief reasoning task was a modified version of the
typical diverse-beliefs task. A 2 (agency: self vs. other) × 2
(consistency: consistent vs. inconsistent) design required all
participants to complete four experimental conditions, including
self-consistent, self-inconsistent, other-consistent, and other-
inconsistent conditions.
The structure of the four conditions was similar. Participants
were presented with a picture of a little ball and two pictures
of containers (e.g., a box and a jar). Then the ball disappeared
and participants were asked to choose the container in which
they thought the ball was hidden. Participants pressed “F” if they
thought the ball was hidden in the left container or “J” for the
right container. After they pressed a key, a red frame would
surround their chosen container (e.g., the box). A headshot of
a boy/girl (each for half of the trials) was then presented with a
red frame surrounding one of the two containers, meaning that
the boy/girl thought the ball was hidden there in. For consistent
conditions, the boy/girl had the same belief about where the ball
was as the participants (e.g., the ball was hidden in the box).
For inconsistent conditions, the boy/girl had a different belief
about where the ball was with the participants (e.g., the ball
was hidden in the jar). Next, participants read an incomplete
question: “Where will ___ look for the ball?” After a blank screen,
the question was completed by a word of agency presented in the
blank space. For self conditions, the word would be “you,” asking
participants to predict their own behavior. For other conditions,
the word would be “he/she,” asking participants to predict the
boy/girl’s behavior. The presentation of the completed question
(“Where will you look for the ball?” or “Where will he/she look
for the ball?”) was the target event for ERP analysis. Participants
were presented with the complete question for 1500 ms then the
two pictures of the containers were presented again for a further
250 ms. Participants needed to provide their answers by pressing
“F” for the left container and “J” for the right container. When
the pictures of the two containers were presented again, their
locations were the same as when they were shown at the first
time in half of the trials and reversed in the other half. Figure 1
illustrates the procedure for the four experimental conditions
when the other headshot showed a boy.
There were 72 trials for each condition in the formal
experiment. Two hundred eighty-eight trials in total were
randomly presented in four blocks. Participants began the formal
experiment only if they could give the correct response in
10 consecutive training trials, which ensured that they fully
understood the structure of the task.
Electrophysiological Recording and
Analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from BrainAmp
amplifiers (Brain Product, Herrsching, Germany) with
64 Ag/AgCl electrodes mounted on an elastic cap according to
the International 10–20 system. An electrode below the right eye
was used to monitor the vertical electrooculogram (EOG) and
another electrode at the external outer canthi of the left eye was
used to monitor the horizontal EOG. The reference electrode
was positioned at FCz and the ground electrode was positioned
at AFz. All electrode impedances were maintained below 5 k.
The EEG and EOG were acquired with a sampling rate of 500 Hz,
a band pass of 0.01–100 Hz. In off-line analysis, electrodes were
re-referenced to average mastoids and a digital band pass filter
of 0.01–30 Hz was applied. EOG artifacts from eye movement
were corrected using an independent component analysis
algorithm. The segment epoch for ERP was 1200 ms, including
a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline. Segments with an incorrect
response or a peak-to-peak deflection exceeding ±100 µV
were excluded from the final averaging. As a result, the average
number of trials per condition submitted for final analysis was
68 for the self-consistent, 67 for the self-inconsistent, 68 for the
other-consistent, and 62 for the other-inconsistent conditions,
respectively.
According to previous studies (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000;
Liu et al., 2004, 2009a,b; Meinhardt et al., 2011; Bowman
et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2016), the components associated
with ToM are normally over the frontal region. In particular,
recent studies confirmed the important role of the pMPFC in
the decoupling mechanism of distinguishing the mental state
of others from one’s own in ToM reasoning (Schuwerk et al.,
2014a,b). Visual inspection of the averaged waveforms of each
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1501
fpsyg-07-01501 October 1, 2016 Time: 13:47 # 4
Jiang et al. Neural Correlates Underlying Belief Reasoning
FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure.
condition and the topographic difference maps in the present
study also suggested that the divergence of waveforms elicited
by the four conditions distributed around frontal and fronto-
central areas (see Figures 2 and 3). For these reasons, five pairs
of electrodes including AF3/AF4, F1/F2, F3/F4, FC1/FC2, and
FC3/FC4, were selected for subsequent statistical analysis. As
shown in Figure 2, four ERP components were elicited by time-
locked stimulus including N1 (70–150 ms), P2 (120–200 ms),
N2 (200–400 ms), and LPC (400–600 ms). The amplitude of
N1, P2, N2, and 50 ms interval mean amplitudes of LPC, were
analyzed with a 5 × 2 × 2 × 2 repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with electrode pairs (AF3/AF4, F1/F2, F3/F4,
FC1/FC2, and FC3/FC4), hemisphere (left vs. right), agency
(self vs. other), and consistency (consistent vs. inconsistent). To
correct for the capitalization, only if at least three consecutive
significant intervals (p < 0.05) of 50 ms were accepted as
truly significant and reported (Gomarus et al., 2009). P-values




The accuracy of the self-consistent, self-inconsistent, other-
consistent, and other-inconsistent conditions was 97.4, 95.4,
96.6, and 90.6%, respectively. A 2 × 2 repeated-measures
ANOVA with agency (self vs. other), and consistency (consistent
vs. inconsistent) revealed a significant difference between the
accuracy of self conditions (96.4%) and that of other conditions
(93.6%), F(1,15) = 6.62, p = 0.02, η2p = 0.31. There was
also a significant difference between the accuracy of consistent
conditions (97.0%) and that of inconsistent conditions (93.0%),
F(1,15) = 17.41, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.54. The interaction between
agency and consistency was also significant, F(1,15) = 5.63,
p = 0.03, η2p = 0.27. Simple effects analyses showed that
the accuracy of self-inconsistent condition was greater than
that of other-inconsistent condition, F(1,15) = 7.04, p = 0.02,
η2p = 0.32, whilst the difference between the accuracy of self-
consistent condition and that of other-consistent condition was
not significant.
ERP Results
Late Positive Component (LPC)
During the LPC (400–600 ms) time window, the overall analysis
showed that the interaction between agency and consistency
was consecutively significant for the 450–500, 500–550, and
550–600 ms post-stimulus epochs, F(1,15) = 21.51, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.59, F(1,15) = 26.24, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.64, and
F(1,15)= 10.79, p= 0.005, η2p = 0.42, respectively. Simple effects
analyses showed that for 450–500 ms, the belief reasoning for
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1501
fpsyg-07-01501 October 1, 2016 Time: 13:47 # 5
Jiang et al. Neural Correlates Underlying Belief Reasoning
FIGURE 2 | Grand-averaged event-related potential waveforms elicited by four conditions at anterior electrode sites.
self (M = 2.10, SD = 0.85) elicited a more positive waveform
than the belief reasoning for others (M = −0.31, SD = 1.06)
when a participant’s own belief was inconsistent with others,
F(1,15) = 16.13, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.52; for 500–550 ms, the belief
reasoning for self (M = 1.55, SD= 1.09) also had a more positive
waveform than the belief reasoning for others (M = −0.91,
SD = 1.16) when a participant’s own belief was inconsistent with
others, F(1,15) = 23.93, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.62; for 550–600 ms,
the belief reasoning for self (M = 0.61, SD = 1.13) continued
to elicit a more positive waveform than the belief reasoning
for others (M = −1.52, SD = 1.28) when a participant’s own
belief was inconsistent with others, F(1,15) = 14.97, p = 0.002,
η2p = 0.50. However, there was no significant difference between
belief reasoning for self and for others when beliefs were
consistent for the three consecutive epochs. The results have been
further confirmed by the topographic difference maps shown in
Figure 3.
N1, P2, and N2
N1: No experimental main effect or interaction was significant for
the N1 amplitude.
P2: The main effect of consistency for the P2 amplitude was
significant, F(1,15) = 12.19, p = 0.003, η2p = 0.45, with a more
positive P2 for inconsistent conditions (M = 4.07, SD = 0.61)
than for consistent conditions (M = 2.79, SD= 0.59).
N2: The main effect of consistency for the N2 amplitude
was significant, F(1,15) = 7.65, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.34, with
a greater negativity for consistent conditions (M = −5.83,
SD = 1.15) than for inconsistent conditions (M = −3.92,
SD= 0.86).
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FIGURE 3 | Topographic maps of difference waves: other-consistent condition subtracted from self-consistent condition (left panel), and
other-inconsistent condition subtracted from self-inconsistent condition (right panel) in the 450–600 ms post-stimulus epoch.
DISCUSSION
To address the electrophysiological bases underlying the
decoupling mechanism in ToM processing, the current study
compared the time course of neural activities associated with
belief reasoning for self and for other people under consistent
and inconsistent conditions. The behavioral results revealed that
the accuracy of belief reasoning for self was significantly greater
than that of belief reasoning for others when the participant’s
own belief was inconsistent with others. However, the difference
between belief reasoning for self and for others was not significant
when the participant and other people shared the same belief.
These findings suggest that belief reasoning for self and for others
is equivalent in processing difficulty when beliefs belonging to
different agencies are the same. While belief reasoning for self
could be easier and faster than that for others if beliefs are in
conflict with each other. The behavioral finding is in line with
the ERP results of LPC in the present study, which also revealed
a significant interaction between agency and consistency and
confirmed the difference between belief reasoning for self and for
others in inconsistent conditions.
The present study revealed that the electrophysiological
divergence was most clearly pronounced on the LPC with an
anterior scalp distribution. The findings are consistent with prior
ERP studies concerning ToM respect to latency and topography
(Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004, 2009a,b; Bowman
et al., 2012; Jiang et al., 2016). The most intriguing finding in
the present study was the significant interaction between agency
and consistency on the amplitudes of LPC during the 450–600 ms
epoch. Results revealed that during the three consecutive epochs,
450–500, 500–550, and 550–600 ms, the mean amplitude of belief
reasoning for self was more positive than that of belief reasoning
for others when the beliefs belonging to different agencies were
inconsistent with each other. There was no difference between the
mean amplitude of belief reasoning for self and for others when
beliefs were consistent during the same epochs. Interestingly, our
prior study concerning another type of mental state in ToM,
desire reasoning, obtained a similar pattern of results (Jiang
et al., 2016). In that study, we investigated the neural bases
of desire reasoning for self and for others when desires were
either consistent or inconsistent. The interaction between agency
and consistency of LPC was also observed. The LPC associated
with desire reasoning was larger in the condition of reasoning
for self than that for others when desires were inconsistent.
Since both the current study concerning belief and the study
concerning desire show the effect of LPC divergence between
mental state reasoning for self and for others, it suggests that
the LPC is responsive to a common substrate involved in ToM
processes.
An important substrate involved in ToM processes is the
decoupling mechanism distinguishing another’s mental state
independently from one’s own (Gallagher and Frith, 2003).
Additionally, Frith and Frith (1999) proposed that the substrates
of ToM included the ability to distinguish actions between one’s
own and those of others. Given the time windows and the
anterior scalp distribution, the LPC in the present study showed
similarity with the P3 component which is associated with
stimuli categorization and evaluation (Ito and Cacioppo, 2000;
Batty and Taylor, 2002; Polich, 2007; Hu et al., 2011). Azizian
et al. (2006) investigated the electrophysiological correlates of
categorizing stimuli varying in similarity and found a larger
P3 for stimuli similar to target than other stimuli. The authors
argued that the P3 amplitude may reflect the categorization based
on similarity. Moreover, Chen et al. (2006) reported that the
judgment of category was manifested on LPC. They proposed
that LPC is responsible for high-level categorization. In the
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present study, the target event to which the ERP data were time-
locked was the question asking participants to predict different
agencies’ behavior. Since the rest part of the question already
presented in the previous screen, the only important target
which participants needed to identify was the word of agency:
“you” for self conditions, and “he/she” for other conditions. To
provide a correct response to the question, participants needed
to consider the belief of the agency mentioned in the question
and then inferred a behavior based on that belief. In inconsistent
conditions, participants’ own belief about the location of the ball
was in conflict with others, which required participants to first
categorize agencies to whom the belief was attributed. There
was no need to categorize different agencies since both they and
other people shared a belief about the location of the ball in
consistent conditions. Thus, the dissociation of LPC occurring in
mental state reasoning for self and for others may represent the
categorization of agencies to which mental states are attributed
in ToM processes. Although previous studies have not discussed
the ERP difference between reasoning for self and for others in
ToM directly, results in the present study can be compared with
ERP studies concerning the processing of information about self
and other. Many studies reported the self-preference effect on P3,
which showed that processing for self is associated with higher
P3 amplitude than for others (Hu et al., 2011; Tacikowski et al.,
2014; Kotlewska and Nowicka, 2015). It is noteworthy that the
self-related information differs from other-related information in
these studies. Consistent with these findings, the present results
revealed that a more positive waveform was elicited by belief
reasoning for self than for others when beliefs belonging to self
and others were different in the 450–600 ms epoch, which can be
associated with the categorization of different agencies involved
in the decoupling mechanism as necessary.
With respect to spatial distribution, the interaction effect was
most clearly observed in anterior regions (see Figure 3). There
was no hemisphere lateralization effect including the main factor
of agency for belief reasoning observed in the present study. It is
consistent with a previous fMRI study by Saxe et al. (2006), which
reported that both belief reasoning for others and self-reflection
activated the medial prefrontal and medial precuneus regions
with no lateral effect. It is also supported by recent findings of
Schuwerk et al. (2014a,b): evidence from both fMRI and rTMS
studies suggest that the pMPFC plays a key role in the decoupling
mechanism to distinguish the self from the others in ToM
reasoning. However, until now, the hemisphere lateralization
effect is still controversial in light of the task diversity in different
studies (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al., 2004, 2009a,b; Zhang
et al., 2009; Bowman et al., 2012). Further studies are needed
to confirm the validity and meaning of the hemisphere effect in
mental states reasoning.
Although the assumption of categorization for different
agencies in the decoupling mechanism is supported by the
aforementioned findings, an alternative explanation for the
dissociation of LPC should be considered. That is the different
inhibiting demands loaded in belief reasoning for self and
for others when beliefs are conflicting might account for
the divergence of LPC observed in the current study. The
present findings cannot eliminate the possibility since the LPC
over the anterior area is also proposed to be associated with
conflict resolution and inhibitory control (Zhang et al., 2009).
Further research is required to examine the validity of the two
explanations.
The results also showed the differences of early components,
including P2 and N2. All of them were associated with the
effect of consistency. According to the experimental procedure
used in the current study, participants gained the information
of the beliefs belonging to themselves which were consistent
or inconsistent with others before the presentation of the
question as a target event. Thus, participants may choose different
strategies to allocate cognitive resources for early processing in
consistent and inconsistent conditions, which result in the effects
of early components. The cognitive processing reflected by the
early components, such as attention and perception (Mangun,
1995; Bigman and Pratt, 2004), provides some preparation
for subsequent ToM reasoning. However, considering that the
components associated with ToM are normally later than 300 ms
after onset of stimulus (Sabbagh and Taylor, 2000; Liu et al.,
2004, 2009a,b; Meinhardt et al., 2011, 2012; Bowman et al.,
2012; Kühn-Popp et al., 2013; Geangu et al., 2013), the effects
of early components are unlikely to be informative about ToM
reasoning per se (McCleery et al., 2011). These results may suggest
that the present study design is not appropriate to investigate
early components in a reliable manner. We will try to improve
the experimental design in the future studies concerning ToM
reasoning to avoid the confusion about early components.
CONCLUSION
The present study shed first light on the neural correlates of
belief reasoning for self and for others under consistent and
inconsistent conditions. Results found that during the 450–
600 ms time period, the LPC elicited by belief reasoning for self
was more positive than for others when beliefs were inconsistent
with each other, which is assumed to represent the categorization
of different agencies in ToM processes.
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